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Abstract
This paper considers a distributed multi-agent optimization problem, with the global objective consisting of the
sum of local objective functions of the agents. The agents solve the optimization problem using local computation
and communication between adjacent agents in the network. We present two randomized iterative algorithms for
distributed optimization. To improve privacy, our algorithms add “structured” randomization to the information
exchanged between the agents. We prove deterministic correctness (in every execution) of the proposed algorithms
despite the information being perturbed by noise with non-zero mean. We prove that a special case of a proposed
algorithm (called function sharing) preserves privacy of individual polynomial objective functions under a suitable
connectivity condition on the network topology.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed optimization has received a lot of attention in the past couple of decades. It involves a system of
networked agents that optimize a global objective function f(x) ,
∑
i fi(x), where fi(x) is the local objective
function of agent i. Each agent is initially only aware of its own local objective function. The agents solve the
global optimization problem in an iterative manner. Each agent maintains “a state estimate”, which it shares with its
neighbors in each iteration, and then updates its state estimate using the information received from the neighbors.
A distributed optimization algorithm must ensure that the state estimates maintained by the agents converge to an
optimum of the global cost function.
Emergence of networked systems has led to the application of distributed optimization framework in several
interesting contexts, such as machine learning, resource allocation and scheduling, and robotics [1], [2]. In a
distributed machine learning scenario, partitions of the dataset are stored among several different agents (such as
servers or mobile devices [3]), and these agents solve a distributed optimization problem in order to collaboratively
learn the most appropriate “model parameters”. In this case, fi(x) at agent i may be a loss function computed over
the dataset stored at agent i, for a given choice x of the model parameters (i.e., here x denotes a vector of model
parameters).
Distributed optimization can reduce communication requirements of learning, since the agents communicate
information that is often much smaller in size than each agent’s local dataset that characterizes its local objective
function. The scalability of distributed optimization algorithms, and their applicability for geo-distributed datasets,
have made them a desirable choice for distributed learning [4]–[6].
Distributed optimization algorithms rely on exchange of information between agents, making them vulnerable to
privacy violations. In particular, in case of distributed learning, the local objective function of each agent is derived
using a local dataset known only to that agent. Through the information exchanged between agents, information
about an agent’s local dataset may become known to other agents. Therefore, privacy concerns have emerged as a
critical challenge in distributed optimization [7], [8].
In this paper we present two algorithms that use “structured randomization” of state estimates shared between
agents. In particular, our structured randomization approach obfuscates the state estimates by adding correlated
random noise. Introduction of random noise into the state estimates allows the agents to improve privacy. Correlation
(as elaborated later) helps to ensure that our algorithms asymptotically converge to a true optimum, despite
perturbation of state estimates with non-zero mean noise. We also prove strong privacy guarantees for a special
case of our algorithm for a distributed polynomial optimization problem. Contributions of this paper are as follows:
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2• We present Randomized State Sharing (RSS) algorithms for distributed optimization that use structured random-
ization. Our first algorithm, named RSS-NB, introduces noise that is Network Balanced (NB), as elaborated
later, and the second algorithm, RSS-LB, introduces Locally Balanced (LB) noise. We prove deterministic
convergence (in every execution) to an optimum, despite the use of randomization.
• We consider a special case of RSS-NB (called “Function Sharing” or FS), where the random perturbations
added to local iterates are state-dependent. State-dependent random perturbations simulate the obfuscation of
objective function using a noise function. We argue that the FS algorithm achieves a strong notion of privacy.
• We use RSS-NB and RSS-LB algorithms to train a deep neural network for digit recognition using the
MNIST dataset, and to train a logistic regression model for document classification of the Reuters dataset. The
experiments validate our theoretical results and we show that we can obtain high accuracy models, despite
introducing randomization to improve privacy.
Related Work: Many distributed optimization algorithms have appeared in the literature over the past decade,
including Sub-gradient Descent [9], [10], Dual Averaging [11], Incremental Algorithms [2], [12], Accelerated
Gradient [13], ADMM [14] and EXTRA [15]. Solutions to distributed optimization of convex functions have
been proposed for myriad scenarios involving directed graphs [16], [17], communication link failures and losses
[18], asynchronous communication models [19]–[21], and stochastic objective functions [10], [22].
Privacy-preserving methods for optimization and learning can be broadly classified into cryptographic approaches
and non-cryptographic approaches [23]. Cryptography-based privacy preserving optimization algorithms [24], [25]
tend to be computationally expensive. Non-cryptographic approaches have gained popularity in recent years. -
differential privacy is a probabilistic technique that involves use of randomized perturbations [26]–[30] to minimize
the probability of uncovering of specific records from databases. Differential privacy methods, however, suffer
from a fundamental trade-off between the accuracy of the solution and the privacy margin (parameter ) [29].
Transformation is another non-cryptographic technique that involves converting a given optimization problem into
a new problem via algebraic transformations such that the solution of the new problem is the same as the solution
of the old problem [31], [32]. This enables agents to conceal private data effectively while the quality of solution is
preserved. Transformation approaches in literature, however, cater only to a relatively small set of problem classes.
II. NOTATION AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a synchronous system consisting of n agents connected using a network of undirected (i.e., bidi-
rectional) communication links. The communication links are always reliable. The set of agents is denoted by V;
thus, |V| = n.
Although all the links are undirected, for convenience, we represent each undirected link using a pair of directed
edges. Define E as a set of directed edges corresponding to the communication links in the network:
E = {(u, v) : u, v ∈ V and u communicates with v}.
Thus, the communication network is represented using a graph G = (V, E). The neighbor set of agent v is defined as
the set of agents that are connected to agent v. By convention, Nv includes v itself, i.e. Nv = {u |(u, v) ∈ E}∪{v}.
We assume that the communication graph G is strongly connected. We impose additional connectivity constraint
later when analyzing privacy in Section IV.
The focus of this paper is on iterative algorithms for distributed optimization. Each agent maintains a state
estimate, which is updated in each iteration of the algorithm. The state estimate at agent i at the start of iteration
k is denoted by xik. We assume that argument x of fi(x) is constrained to be in a feasible set X ⊂ RD. The state
estimate of each agent is initialized to an arbitrary vector in X . For z ∈ RD, we define projection operator PX as,
PX (z) = arg min
y∈X
‖z − y‖.
Problem 1 below formally defines the goal of distributed optimization.
Problem 1. Given local objective function fi(x) at each agent i ∈ V , and feasible set X ⊂ RD (i.e., the set of
feasible x), design a distributed algorithm such that, for some
x∗ ∈ arg minx∈X
n∑
i=1
fi(x),
we have
lim
k→∞
xik = x
∗, ∀i ∈ V.
3Let f∗ denote the optimal value of f(x), i.e.
f∗ = inf
x∈X
f(x).
Let X ∗ denote the set of all optima of f(x), i.e.,
X ∗ = {x | x ∈ X , f(x) = f∗}.
Let ‖.‖ denote the Euclidean norm. For any matrix A, ‖A‖2 =
√
λmax(A†A), where A† denotes conjugate transpose
of matrix A, and λmax is the maximum eigenvalue. We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 (Objective Function and Feasible Set).
1) The feasible set, X , is a non-empty, convex, and compact subset of RD.
2) The objective function fi : X → R, ∀i ∈ V , is a convex function. Thus, f(x) :=
∑n
i=1 fi(x) is also a convex
function.
3) The set of optima, X ∗, is non-empty and bounded.
Assumption 2 (Gradient Bound and Lipschitzness).
1) The gradients are norm-bounded, i.e., ∃ L > 0 such that, ‖∇fi(x)‖ ≤ L, ∀ x ∈ X and ∀ i ∈ V .
2) The gradients are Lipschitz continuous, i.e., ∃ N > 0 such that, ‖∇fi(x)−∇fi(y)‖ ≤ N‖x− y‖, ∀ x, y ∈ X
and ∀ i ∈ V .
III. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHMS
This section first presents an iterative Distributed Gradient Descent algorithm (DGD) from prior literature [9].
Later we modify DGD to improve privacy. In particular, we present two algorithms based on Randomized State
Sharing (RSS).
A. DGD Algorithm [9]
Iterative distributed algorithms such as Distributed Gradient Descent (DGD) use a combination of consensus
dynamics and local gradient descent to distributedly find a minimizer of f(x). More precisely, in each iteration,
each agent receives state estimates from its neighbors and performs a consensus step followed by descent along
the direction of the gradient of its local objective function.
The pseudo-code for the DGD algorithm is presented below as Algorithm 0. The algorithm presents the steps
performed by any agent j ∈ V . The different agents perform their steps in parallel. Lines 4-5 are intentionally left
blank in Algorithm 0, to facilitate comparison with other algorithms presented later in the paper.
As shown on Lines 6 and 7 of Algorithm 0, in the k-th iteration, each agent j first sends its current estimate
xjk to the neighbors, and then receives the estimates from all its neighbors. Using these estimates, as shown on
line 8, each agent performs a consensus step (also called information fusion), which involves computing a convex
combination of the state estimates. The resulting convex combination is named vjk. Matrix Bk used in this step is a
doubly stochastic matrix [9], which can be constructed by the agents using previously proposed techniques,1 such
as Metropolis weights [33]. The Metropolis weights are:
Bk[i, j] =

1/(1 + max(|Ni|, |Nj |)) if j ∈ Ni
1−∑l 6=iBk[i, l] if i = j
0 otherwise
Agent j performs projected gradient descent step (Line 9, Algorithm 0) involving descent from vjk along the
local objective function’s gradient ∇fj(vjk), followed by projection onto the feasible set X . This step yields the
new state estimate at agent j, namely, xjk+1. αk used on line 9 is called the step size. The sequence αk, k ≥ 1, is
a non-increasing sequence such that
∑∞
k=1 αk =∞ and
∑∞
k=1 α
2
k <∞.
Prior work [9] has shown that DGD Algorithm 0 solves Problem 1, that is, the agents’ state estimates asymptotically
reach consensus on an optimum in X ∗.
DGD is not designed to be privacy-preserving and an adversary may learn information about an agent’s local
objective function by observing information exchange between the agents. We now introduce algorithms that perturb
the state estimates before the estimates are shared between the agents. The perturbations are intended to hide the
true state estimate values and improve privacy.
1Bk has the property that entries Bk[i, j] and Bk[j, i] are non-zero if and only if i ∈ Nj . Recall that the underlying network is assumed to
consist of bidirectional links. Therefore, i ∈ Nj implies j ∈ Ni.
4Algorithm 0 DGD Algorithm [9]
1: Input: αk (k ≥ 1), MAX ITER.
Initialization: xj1 ∈ X , ∀j ∈ V .
2: The steps performed by each agent j ∈ V:
3: for k = 1 to MAX ITER do
4:
5:
6: Send estimate xjk to each agent i ∈ Nj
7: Receive estimate xik from each agent i ∈ Nj
8: Information Fusion:
vjk =
∑
i∈Nj Bk[j, i]x
i
k
9: Projected Gradient Descent:
xjk+1 = PX
[
vjk − αk∇fj(vjk)
]
10: end for
B. RSS-NB Algorithm
The first proposed algorithm, named Randomized State Sharing−Network Balanced (RSS-NB) is a modified
version of Algorithm 0. The pseudo-code for algorithm RSS-NB is presented as Algorithm 1 below.
Random variables si,jk are used to compute the perturbations. We will discuss the procedure for computing
the perturbation after describing the rest of the algorithm. As we will discuss in more detail later, on Line 4 of
Algorithm 1, agent j computes perturbation djk to be used in iteration k. On Line 5, the perturbation is weighted
by step size αk and added to state estimate x
j
k to obtain the perturbed state estimate w
j
k of agent j. That is,
wjk = x
j
k + αkd
j
k. (1)
αk here is the step size, which is also used in the information fusion step in Line 8. Properties satisfied by αk are
identical to those in the DGD Algorithm 0.
Having computed the perturbed estimate wjk, each agent then sends the perturbed estimate w
j
k to its neighbors
(Line 6) and receives the perturbed estimates of the neighbors (Line 7, Algorithm 1). Similar to Algorithm 0, Steps
8 and 9 of the RSS-NB algorithm also perform information fusion using a doubly stochastic matrix Bk, followed
by projected gradient descent.
Now we describe how the perturbation djk ∈ RD is computed on Line 4 of Algorithm 1. The strategy for
computing the perturbation is motivated by a secure distributed averaging algorithm in [34]. In iteration k, the
computation of the perturbation djk at agent j uses variables s
j,i
k and s
i,j
k , i ∈ Nj , which take values in RD. As
shown on Line 4, the perturbation djk is computed as follows.
djk =
∑
i∈Nj
si,jk −
∑
i∈Nj
sj,ik . (2)
Initially, as shown on Line 1, si,j1 = s
j,i
1 is the 0 vector (i.e., all elements 0) for all i ∈ Nj . Thus, the perturbation
dj1 computed in iteration 1 is also the 0 vector. As shown on Line 6 of Algorithm 1, in iteration k ≥ 1, agent j
sends to each neighbor i a random vector sj,ik+1 and then (on Line 7) it receives random vector s
i,j
k+1 from each
neighbor i. These random vectors are then used to compute the random perturbations in Line 4 of the next iteration.
Due to the manner in which djk is computed, we obtain the following invariant for all iterations k ≥ 1.∑
j∈V
djk = 0. (3)
The distribution from which the random vectors sj,ik are drawn affects the privacy achieved with this algorithm.
In our analysis, we will assume that ‖sj,ik ‖ ≤ ∆/(2n), for all i, j, k, where constant ∆ is a parameter of the
algorithm, and n = |V| is the number of agents. Procedure for the Computation of perturbation djk, as shown in
(2), then implies that ‖djk‖ ≤ ∆. As elaborated later, there is a trade-off between privacy and convergence rate of
the algorithm, with larger ∆ resulting in slower convergence rate.
5Algorithm 1 RSS-NB Algorithm
1: Input: αk (k ≥ 1), MAX ITER.
Initialization: xj1 ∈ X , ∀j ∈ V and
si,j1 = s
j,i
1 = 0, ∀j ∈ V, i ∈ Nj .
2: The steps performed by each agent j ∈ V:
3: for k = 1 to MAX ITER do
4: Compute perturbation djk:
djk =
∑
i∈Nj s
i,j
k −
∑
i∈Nj s
j,i
k
5: Compute perturbed state wjk:
wjk = x
j
k + αkd
j
k
6: Send wjk and a random vector s
j,i
k+1 to i ∈ Nj .
7: Receive wik and s
i,j
k+1 from i ∈ Nj .
8: Information Fusion:
vjk =
∑
i∈Nj Bk[j, i]w
i
k
9: Projected Gradient Descent:
xjk+1 = PX
[
vjk − αk∇fj(vjk)
]
10: end for
Algorithm 2 RSS-LB Algorithm
1: Input: αk (k ≥ 1), MAX ITER.
Initialization: xj0 ∈ X , ∀j ∈ V .
2: The steps performed by each agent j ∈ V:
3: for k = 1 to MAX ITER do
4: Choose random vector dj,ik , i ∈ Nj , such that,∑
i∈Nj Bk[i, j]d
j,i
k = 0.
5: Compute perturbed state wj,ik :
wj,ik = x
j
k + αkd
j,i
k
6: Send wj,ik to each i ∈ Nj .
7: Receive wi,jk from each i ∈ Nj .
8: Information Fusion:
vjk =
∑
i∈Nj Bk[j, i]w
i,j
k
9: Projected Gradient Descent:
xjk+1 = PX
[
vjk − αk∇fj(vjk)
]
10: end for
C. RSS-LB Algorithm
Our second algorithm is called Randomized State Sharing−Locally Balanced algorithm (RSS-LB). Recall that in
RSS-NB Algorithm 1, each agent shares an identical perturbed estimate with its neighbors. Instead, in RSS-LB, each
agent shares potentially distinct perturbed state estimates with different neighbors. The pseudo-code for RSS-NB
is presented as Algorithm 2.
On Line 4 of Algorithm 2, in iteration k, agent j chooses a noise vector dj,ik ∈ RD for each i ∈ Nj such that
dj,jk = 0, ‖dj,ik ‖ ≤ ∆, where constant ∆ is a parameter of the algorithm, and∑
i∈Nj
Bk[i, j]d
j,i
k = 0. (4)
For convenience, for i 6∈ Nj , define dj,ik = 0, that is, the perturbations for non-neighbors are zero. Here, matrix Bk
is identical to that used in the information fusion step in Line 8. Observe that each agent j uses Bk[j, i], i ∈ Nj ,
in the information fusion step, and Bk[i, j], i ∈ Nj , in the computation of above noise vectors. In both cases,
the matrix elements used by agent j correspond only to its neighbors in the network. Since the random vectors
generated by each agent j are locally balanced, as per (4) above, the agents do not need to cooperate in generating
the perturbations (unlike the RSS-NB algorithm).
Using dj,ik as the perturbation for neighbor i, in Line 5 of Algorithm 2, agent j computes the perturbed state
estimate wj,ik to be sent to neighbor i, as follows.
wj,ik = x
j
k + αkd
j,i
k . (5)
αk here is the step size, which is also used in the information fusion step in Line 8. Properties satisfied by αk are
identical to thos in the DGD Algorithm 0.
Next, in Lines 6 and 7 of Algorithm 2, agent j sends wj,ik to each neighbor i and receives perturbed estimate
wi,jk from each neighbor i. Agent j performs the information fusion step in Line 8 followed by projected gradient
descent in Line 9, similar to the previous algorithms.
D. FS Algorithm
The function sharing algorithm FS presented in this section can be viewed as a special case of the RSS-NB
algorithm. In this special case of RSS-NB, the random vector sj,ik computed by agent j is a function of its state
estimate xjk, where the function is independent of k. Thus, the function sharing algorithm uses state-dependent
random vectors. The pseudo-code for function sharing is presented in Algorithm 3 below using random functions,
6Algorithm 3 Function Sharing (FS) Algorithm
1: The steps performed by each agent j ∈ V
2: Select a function sj,i(x), ∀i ∈ Nj .
3: Agent j sends function sj,i(x) to each i ∈ Nj .
4: Agent j computes a noise function pj(x) and then the obfuscated local objective function f̂j(x) as follows:
pj(x) =
∑
i∈Nj
si,j(x)−
∑
i∈Nj
sj,i(x). (8)
f̂j(x) , fj(x) + pj(x) (9)
5: Perform DGD (Algorithm 0) wherein agent j uses f̂j(x) as its local objective function instead of fj(x).
instead of state-dependent random vectors. However, the behavior of Algorithm 3 is equivalent to using state-
dependent noise in RSS-NB.
In Line 1 of Algorithm 3, each agent j selects a function sj,i(x) to be sent to neighbor i in Line 2. These
functions are exchanged by the agents. Agent j then uses them in Line 3 to compute the noise function, which is,
in turn, used to compute an obfuscated local objective function f̂j(x). Finally, the agents perform DGD Algorithm
0 with each agent j using f̂j(x) as its objective function. We assume that sj,i(x) have bounded and Lipschitz
gradients. This implies the obfuscated functions f̂j(x) satisfy assumption A2. The obfuscated objective function
f̂j(x) is not necessarily convex. Despite this, the correctness of this algorithm can be proved using the following
observations: ∑
j∈V
pj(x) = 0, and (6)∑
j∈V
f̂j(x) =
∑
j∈V
fj(x) = f(x) (7)
Effectively, Algorithm 3 minimizes a convex sum of non-convex functions. Distributed optimization of a convex
sum of non-convex functions, albeit with an additional assumption of strong convexity of f(x), was also addressed
in [35], wherein the correctness is shown using Lyapunov stability arguments. However, [35] also does not address
how privacy may be achieved. Additionally, our approach for improving privacy is more general than function
sharing, as exemplified by algorithms RSS-NB and RSS-LB.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
The specification of Problem 1 in Section II identifies the requirement for correctness of the proposed algorithms.
The proof of Theorem 1 below is outlined in Section V and presented in detail in Appendix C.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, RSS-NB Algorithm 1, RSS-LB Algorithm 2 and FS Algorithm 3 solve
distributed optimization Problem 1.
Theorem 1 implies that the sequence of iterates {xjk}, generated by each agent j converges to an optimum in
X ∗ asymptotically, despite the introduction of perturbations.
Now we discuss privacy improvement achieved by our algorithms. We consider an adversary that compromises
a set of up to f agents, denoted as A (thus, |A| ≤ f ). The adversary can observe everything that each agent in A
observes. In particular, the adversary has the knowledge of the local objective functions of agents in A, their state,
and their communication to and from all their neighbors. Furthermore, the adversary knows the network topology.
The goal here is to prevent the adversary from learning the local objective function of any agent i 6∈ A. The
introduction of perturbations in the state estimates helps improve privacy, by creating an ambiguity in the following
sense. To be able to exactly determine fi(x) for any i 6∈ A, the adversary’s observations of the communication
to and from agents in A has to be compatible with the actual fi(x), but not with any other possible choice for
the local objective function of agent i. The larger the set of feasible local objective functions of agent i that are
compatible with the adversary’s observations, greater is the ambiguity. The introduction of noise naturally increases
this ambiguity, with higher ∆ (noise parameter) resulting in greater privacy. However, this improved privacy comes
7with a performance cost, as Theorem 3 will show. Before we discuss Theorem 3, we first present more precise
claims for privacy for the FS algorithm.
Privacy Claims: Let F denote the set of all feasible instances of Problem 1, characterized by sets of local objective
functions. Thus, each element of F , say {g1(x), g2(x), · · · , gn(x)} corresponds to an instance of Problem 1, where
the gi(x) become the local objective functions for each agent i. When each agent’s local objective function is
restricted to be any polynomial of a bounded degree, the set of feasible functions forms an additive group. Theorem 2
makes a claim regarding the privacy achieved using function sharing in this case.
Definition 1. Recall that F is the set of all possible instance of Problem 1. The adversary’s observations are said to
be compatible with problem instance {g1(x), g2(x), · · · , gn(x)} ∈ F if the information available to the adversary
may be produced when agent i’s local objective function is gi(x) for each i ∈ V .
Theorem 2. Let the local objective function of each agent be restricted to be a polynomial of a bounded degree.
Consider an execution of the FS algorithm in which the local objective function of each agent i is fi(x). Then FS
algorithm provides the following privacy guarantees:
(P1) Let the network graph G have a minimum degree ≥ f + 1. For any agent i 6∈ A, choose any feasible local
objective function gi(x) 6= fi(x). The adversary’s observations in the above execution are compatible with at
least one feasible problem in F in which agent i’s local objective function equals gi(x). In other words, the
adversary cannot learn function fi(x) for i 6∈ A.
(P2) Let the network graph G have vertex connectivity ≥ f + 1. For each I ⊂ V − A, choose a feasible local
objective function gi(x) 6= fi(x) for each i ∈ I. The adversary’s observations in the above execution are
compatible at least one feasible problem in F wherein, for i ∈ I, agent i’s local objective function is gi(x).
In other words, the adversary cannot learn
∑
i∈I fi(x).
The proof for property (P2) in Theorem 2 is sketched in Section VI and detailed in Appendix F. Property (P1) can
be proved similarly.
Convergence-Privacy Trade-off: Addition of perturbations to the state estimates can improve privacy, however,
it also degrades the convergence rate. Analogous to the finite-time analysis presented in [11], the theorem below
assumes αk = 1/
√
k, and provides a convergence result for a weighted time-average of the state estimates x̂jT
defined below.
Theorem 3. Let estimates {xjk} be generated by RSS-NB or RSS-LB with αk = 1/
√
k. For each j ∈ V , let
x̂jT =
∑T
k=1 αkx
j
k∑T
k=1 αk
.
Then,
f(x̂jT )− f(x∗) = O
(
(1 + ∆2)
log(T )√
T
)
.
Section V presents the proof. The above theorem shows that the gap between the optimal function value and
function value at the time-average of state estimates (x̂jk) has a gap that is quadratic in noise bound ∆. The
dependence on time T in the convergence result above is similar to that for DGD in [11], [16], and is a consequence
of the consensus-based local gradient method used here. The quadratic dependence on ∆ is a consequence of
structured randomization. Larger ∆ results in slower convergence, however, would result in larger randomness in
the iterates, improving privacy.
Random perturbations used in algorithms RSS-NB and RSS-LB cause a slowdown in convergence, however, do
not introduce an error in the outcome. This is different from ˜-Differential Privacy where perturbations result in
slowdown in addition to an error of the order of O(1/˜2) [29].
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We sketch the analysis of RSS-NB here. Analysis of RSS-LB and FS follows similar structure. For brevity, only
key results are presented here. Detailed proofs are available in Appendix (also [36], [37]). We often refer to the
8state estimate of an agent as its iterate. Define iterate average (x¯k, at iteration k) and the disagreement of iterate
xjk agent j with x¯k as,
x¯k =
1
n
n∑
j=1
xjk, and (10)
δjk = x
j
k − x¯k. (11)
The computation on Line 8 of RSS-NB Algorithm 1 can be represented using “true-state”, denoted as v̂jk, and
a perturbation, ejk, as follows.
v̂jk =
n∑
i=1
Bk[j, i]x
i
k, (12)
ejk =
n∑
i=1
Bk[j, i]d
i
k, (13)
vjk =
n∑
i=1
Bk[j, i]w
i
k = v̂
j
k + αke
j
k (14)
Since
∑
j d
j
k = 0 and Bk is doubly stochastic, we get,
∑
j e
j
k = 0 (see Appendix for details).
Similarly for RSS-LB, computation on Line 8 of RSS-LB Algorithm 2 can be represented using “true state”,
denoted as v̂jk, and a perturbation, e
j
k, as follows.
v̂jk =
n∑
i=1
Bk[j, i]x
i
k, (15)
ejk =
n∑
i=1
Bk[j, i]d
i,j
k , (16)
vjk =
n∑
i=1
Bk[j, i]w
i,j
k = v̂
j
k + αke
j
k (17)
Following the construction of noise (Line 4 in Algorithm 2) we can show
∑
j e
j
k = 0 (see Appendix for details).
Now we can represent the projected gradient descent step (Line 9 of Algorithm 1 or Line 9 of Algorithm 2) as,
xjk+1 = PX
[
v̂jk − αk
(
∇fj(vjk)− ejk
)]
. (18)
Note that the same equation holds for both RSS-NB and RSS-LB where ejk definition is defined by Eq. 13 for
RSS-NB and Eq. 16 for RSS-LB. In the above expression, the perturbation can be viewed simply as noise in the
gradient. This perspective is useful for the analysis. Using a result from [10] on linear convergence of product of
doubly stochastic matrices, we obtain a bound on disagreement ‖δjk‖ in Lemma 1 below.
Lemma 1. For constant β < 1 and constant θ that both only depend on the network G, doubly-stochastic matrices
Bk, iterates x
j
k generated by RSS-NB, RSS-LB, and for k ≥ 1
max
j∈V
‖δjk+1‖ ≤ nθβk maxi∈V ‖x
i
1‖+ 2αk (L+ ∆) + nθ(L+ ∆)
k∑
l=2
βk+1−lαl−1
The proof of Lemma 1 is presented in Appendix A.
Lemma 1 can be used to show that the iterates maintained by the different agents asymptotically reach consensus.
Lemma 2 below provides a bound on the distance between iterates and the optimum.
Lemma 2. For iterates xjk generated by RSS-NB, RSS-LB, y ∈ X and k ≥ 1, the following holds,
η2k+1 ≤ (1 + Fk) η2k − 2αk (f(x¯k)− f(y)) +Hk,
where η2k =
n∑
j=1
‖xjk − y‖2, Fk = αkN
(
max
j∈V
‖δjk‖+ αk∆
)
, and
Hk = 2αkn(L+
N
2
+ ∆) max
j∈V
‖δjk‖+ α2kn
(
N∆ + (L+ ∆)2
)
.
9The proof of Lemma 2 is presented in Appendix B. The expressions in Lemma 2 has the same structure as
supermartingale convergence result from [38]. We can show that
∑
kHk < ∞ and
∑
k Fk < ∞. Then using the
result from [38] asymptotic convergence of the iterate average x¯k to an optimum x∗ ∈ X ∗ can be proved, proving
Theorem 1.
Proof of Thoerem 3: Next, we sketch the proof of Theorem 3, which uses Lemma 2. The detailed proof of
Theorem 3 is presented in Appendix G. As discussed earlier, Theorem 3 assumes αk = 1/
√
k. Recall the definition
of x̂jT in Theorem 3. Let ¯̂xT =
1
n
∑n
j=1 x̂
j
T . Observing that ¯̂xT also equals
∑T
k=1 αkx¯k and using the fact that
f(x) is convex, we get,
f(¯̂xT )− f∗ ≤
∑T
k=1 αkf(x¯k)∑T
k=1 αk
− f∗ =
∑T
k=1 αk (f(x¯k)− f∗)∑T
k=1 αk
Lemma 2 and the observation
∑T
k=1 αk ≥
√
T yields:
f(¯̂xT )− f∗ ≤
∑T
k=1
(
(1 + Fk)η
2
k − η2k+1 +Hk
)
2
∑T
k=1 αk
≤ η
2
1 +
∑T
k=1
(
Fkη
2
k +Hk
)
2
√
T
Next we bound
∑T
k=1 Fk and
∑T
k=1Hk.
T∑
k=1
Fk = 2N
T∑
k=1
αk max
j
‖δjk‖+ 2N∆
T∑
k=1
α2k ≤ 2N
T∑
k=1
αk max
j
‖δjk‖+ 2N∆(log(T ) + 1)
T∑
k=1
Hk ≤ 2n(L+N/2 + ∆)
T∑
k=1
αk max
j
‖δjk‖+ n[(L+ ∆)2 +N∆](log(T ) + 1)
Use Lemma 1 to bound
∑T
k=1 αk maxj ‖δjk‖.
f(¯̂xT )− f∗ ≤ C0 + C1 log(T ) + C2 log(T − 1)√
T
We then use the Lipschitzness of f(x) to arrive at,
f(x̂jT )− f∗ = f(x̂jT )− f(¯̂xT ) + f(¯̂xT )− f∗
≤ L‖x̂jT − ¯̂xT ‖+
C0 + (C1 + C2) log(T )
2
√
T
where C1, C2 = O(∆2)
= O
(
(1 + ∆2)
log(T )√
T
)

VI. PRIVACY WITH FUNCTION SHARING
In this section we consider a special case of Problem 1. Assume that all objective functions fi(x) are polynomials
with degree ≤ d. Consequently, f(x) is a polynomial with deg(f(x)) ≤ d. We now prove property (P2) in
Theorem 2; the proof of property (P1) can be obtained similarly.
Proof of Theorem 2 (P2): In particular, we use a constructive approach to show that given any execution, any
feasible candidate for objective functions of nodes in any subset I ⊂ V − A is compatible with the adversary’s
observations.
Suppose that the actual local objective function of each agent i in a given execution is fi(x). Consider subset
I ⊂ V − A, and consider any feasible local objective function gi(x) for each i ∈ I. Now, for any i ∈ A, let
gi(x) = fi(x) (adversary observes own objective functions). Also, since the functions are polynomials of bounded
degree, it should be easy to see that, for each i ∈ V − A − I, we can find local objective functions gi(x) such
that
∑
i∈V−A gi(x) =
∑
i∈V−A fi(x), for all x ∈ X . Thus, for the given functions gi(x) for i ∈ I, we have found
feasible local objective functions gi(x) for all agents such that – i) the local objective functions of compromised
10
Fig. 1: Function suboptimality v/s iterations.
agents are identical to those in the actual execution, and ii) the sum of objective functions of “good” nodes is
preserved
∑
i∈V−A gi(x) =
∑
i∈V−A fi(x).
Recall that the function sharing algorithm adds noise functions to obtain perturbed function f̂i(x) at each agent
i ∈ V . In particular, agent j sends to each neighboring agent i a noise function, say sj,i(x), and subsequently
computes f̂i(x) using the noise functions it sent to neighbors and the noise functions received from the neighbors.
When the vertex connectivity of the graph is at least f + 1 it is easy to show that, for local objective functions
{g1(x), g2(x), · · · , gn(x)} defined above, each agent j ∈ V − A can select noise functions, say tj,i(x) for each
neighbor i, with the following properties:
• For each j ∈ V − A and neighbor i of j such that i ∈ A, tj,i(x) = sj,i(x) for all x ∈ X . That is, the noise
functions exchanged with agents in A are unchanged.
• For each j ∈ V −A,
gj(x) +
∑
i∈Nj
ti,j(x)−
∑
i∈Nj
tj,i(x) = f̂j(x).
That is, the obfuscated function of each agent in V −A remains the same as that in the original execution.
Due to the above two properties, the observations of the adversary in the above execution will be identical to those
in the original execution. Thus, the adversary cannot distinguish between the two executions. This, in turn, implies
property (P2) in Theorem 2. Property (P1) can be proved similarly. 
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We now provide some experimental results for RSS-NB and RSS-LB algorithms. We present two sets of
experiments. First, we show that RSS-NB and RSS-LB correctly solve distributed optimization of polynomial
objective functions. Next, we apply our algorithms in the context of machine learning for handwritten digit
classification (using MNIST dataset) and document classification (using Reuters dataset).
Polynomial Optimization: We solve polynomial optimization on a network of 5 agents that form a cycle. The
objective functions of the 5 agents are chosen as f1(x) = x2, f2(x) = x4, f3(x) = x2 + x4, f4(x) = x2 + 0.5x4,
and f5(x) = 0.5x2 + x4. The aggregate function f(x) = 2.5(x2 + x4). We consider X = [−30, 30]. Simulation
results in Figure 1 show that the two algorithms converge to the optimum x∗ = 0 for two different values of ∆.
Large ∆ results in larger perturbations and the convergence is slower. For smaller ∆, as expected, the performance
of both RSS-NB and RSS-LB is closer to DGD.
Machine Learning: We consider two classification problems. We use a deep neural network [7] for digit recognition
using the MNIST dataset [39] and regularized logistic regression for the Reuters dataset [40]. We use two graph
topologies: a cycle of 5 agents (namely, C5) and a complete graph of 5 agents (namely, K5).
Due to the high overhead of computing gradients on full datasets, we evaluate versions of the different algorithm
that are adapted to perform stochastic gradient descent (SGD) on minibatches of local, non-overlapping datasets,
11
Fig. 2: Accuracy for MNIST (top row) and Reuters (bottom row) with C5 (left) and K5 (right) topologies. Y -axis
is the testing accuracy in % and X-axis is epochs. SGD-C is a centralized solution.
to solve the distributed machine learning problem. Also, by performing consensus only every 40 gradient steps of
gradient descent, we decrease network overhead, while still retaining the accuracy. Figure 2 shows convergence
results for DGD, RSS-NB and RSS-LB, and a centralize algorithms SGD-C, which demonstrate that our algorithms
can achieve high accuracy despite the introduction of perturbances in state estimates.
• MNIST: Our algorithms converge quickly despite the deep learning problem being non-convex and despite
using stochastic gradient descent.
• Reuters: We achieve testing accuracy comparable to a centralized solution SGD-C. DGD works best followed
by RSS-NB and RSS-LB for cycle topology.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we develop and analyze iterative distributed optimization algorithms RSS-NB, RSS-LB and FS
that exploit structured randomness to improve privacy, while maintaining accuracy. We prove convergence and
develop trade-off between convergence rate and the bound on perturbation. We provide claims of privacy for the FS
algorithm, which is a special case of RSS-NB. We apply versions of RSS-NB and RSS-LB to distributed machine
learning, and evaluating their effectiveness for training with MNIST and Reuters datasets.
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APPENDIX
Summary of symbols and constants used in the analysis is presented in Table I
Symbol Description
V Set of Agents
E Set of Communication Links (Edges)
G(V, E) Graph with Nodes V and Edges E
n Number of Agents n = |V|
Nj Neighborhood set of agent j
f(x) Objective function
fi(x) Objective function associated with Agent i
D Dimension of the optimization problem (size of vector x)
X Feasible Set (Model Parameters)
X ∗ Optimal Set (Model Parameters)
xjk Estimate of iterate (state) with agent j at time k
x¯k Average iterate (over the network) at time k
δjk Disagreement between agent j and iterate-average, δ
j
k = x
j
k − x¯k
L Gradient bound, ‖∇fi(x)‖ ≤ L
N Lipschitz constant for ∇fi(x)
Bk Doubly stochastic matrix
ρ Smallest non-zero entry in matrix Bk
αk Learning step-size
djk Correlated random perturbation
wjk Perturbed local model estimate
∆ Random perturbation bound, ‖djk‖ ≤ ∆
vjk Fused (perturbed) model estimate, Eq. 14
vˆjk Fused (true) model estimate, Eq. 12
ejk Fused perturbation, Eq. 13
Φ(k, s) Transition Matrix
θ Transition matrix convergence parameter, θ = (1− ρ
4n2
)−2
β Transition matrix convergence parameter, β = (1− ρ
4n2
)
η2k Distance between iterate and optimum, η
2
k =
∑n
j=1 ‖xjk − y‖2
ξ2k Distance between fused iterate and optimum, ξ
2
k =
∑n
j=1 ‖vˆjk − y‖2
Fk Fk = αkN
(
maxj∈V ‖δjk‖+ αk∆
)
Hk Hk = 2αknmaxj∈V ‖δjk‖(L+N/2 + ∆) + α2kn
[
N∆ + (L+ ∆)2
]
TABLE I: Parameters and Constants
We will analyze both RSS-NB and RSS-LB simultaneously. Before we move on to the proofs, we first define key
bounds on the error for both the algorithms. We first establish the boundedness of error term in Eq. 13 (for RSS-NB)
and in Eq. 17 (for RSS-LB). We also show that the error adds to zero over the network. These relationships will
be critical for proving the convergence of our algorithms.
• RSS-NB
– Boundedness (‖ejk‖ ≤ ∆): The noise perturbations si,jk are bounded by ∆/2n. It follows that, djk =
∑
i∈Nj s
i,j
k −∑
i∈Nj s
j,i
k will also be bounded, ‖djk‖ ≤ ∆ since node j may have at most n−1 neighbors. Following Eq. 13,
we can show, ‖ejk‖ = ‖
∑
i∈Nj Bk[j, i]d
i
k‖ ≤
∑
i∈Nj Bk[j, i]‖dik‖ since Bk[j, i] is non-negative.
‖ejk‖ ≤
n∑
i=1
Bk[j, i]‖dik‖ ≤ ∆
n∑
i=1
Bk[j, i] = ∆. (19)
– Aggregate Randomness (
∑
j e
j
k = 0): We prove this using Eq. 13, followed by the fact that Bk matrix is a
doubly stochastic matrix.
n∑
j=1
ejk =
n∑
j=1
∑
i∈Nj
Bk[j, i]d
i
k
 = n∑
i=1
 n∑
j=1
Bk[j, i]
 dik = n∑
i=1
dik = 0. (from Eq. 3) (20)
• RSS-LB
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– Boundedness (‖ejk‖ ≤ ∆): The noise perturbations di,jk are bounded by ∆ (by construction) i.e. ‖di,jk ‖ ≤ ∆.
Following Eq. 16, we have, ‖ejk‖ = ‖
∑
i∈Nj Bk[j, i]d
i,j
k ‖ ≤
∑
i∈Nj Bk[j, i]‖d
i,j
k ‖ since Bk[j, i] is non-negative
and Bk is doubly stochastic.
‖ejk‖ ≤
n∑
i=1
Bk[j, i]‖di,jk ‖ ≤ ∆
n∑
i=1
Bk[j, i] = ∆. (21)
– Aggregate Randomness (
∑
j e
j
k = 0): We prove this using Eq. 16, and Eq. 4.
n∑
j=1
ejk =
n∑
j=1
∑
i∈Nj
Bk[j, i]d
i,j
k
 = 0. (from Eq. 4) (22)
Next, we prove an important relationship between the iterate-average and average of “true-state” defined in Eq. 14
(for RSS-NB) and in Eq. 17 (for RSS-LB).
v¯k ,
1
n
n∑
j=1
vˆjk =
1
n
n∑
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
Bk[j, i]x
i
k
)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
 n∑
j=1
Bk[j, i]
xik
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
xik = x¯k
n∑
j=1
Bk[j, i] = 1, Bk is column stochastic (23)
We have showed that the iterate-average stays preserved under convex averaging. This proof is adapted from [9].
We define transition matrix, Φ(k, s), as the product of doubly stochastic weight matrices Bk,
Φ(k, s) = BkBk−1 . . . Bs+1Bs, (∀ k ≥ s > 0).
We first note two important results from literature. The first result relates to convergence of non-negative sequences
(Lemma 3) and the second result describes the linear convergence of transition matrix to 1n11
T (Lemma 4).
Lemma 3 (Lemma 3.1, [10]). Let {ζk} be a non-negative scalar sequence. If
∑∞
k=0 ζk <∞ and 0 < β < 1, then∑∞
k=0
(∑k
j=0 β
k−jζj
)
<∞.
Lemma 4 (Corollary 1, [41]). Let the graph G be connected, then,
1) limk→∞Φ(k, s) = 1n11
T for all s > 0.
2) |Φ(k, s)[i, j]− 1n | ≤ θβk−s+1 for all k ≥ s > 0, where θ = (1− ρ4n2 )−2 and β = (1− ρ4n2 ).
The well known non-expansive property (cf. [42]) of Euclidean projection onto a non-empty, closed, convex set X ,
is represented by the following inequality, ∀ x, y ∈ RD,
‖PX [x]− PX [y]‖ ≤ ‖x− y‖. (24)
We state the deterministic version of a known result on the convergence of non-negative almost supermartinagales.
Lemma 5. [38]. Let {Fk}, {Ek}, {Gk} and {Hk}, be non-negative, real sequences. Assume that
∑∞
k=0 Fk <∞,
and
∑∞
k=0Hk <∞ and
Ek+1 ≤ (1 + Fk)Ek −Gk +Hk.
Then, the sequence {Ek} converges to a non-negative real number and
∑∞
k=0Gk <∞.
The proofs in this report follow the structure similar to [10], with the key difference being in proof for Lemma 2
and Theorem 1.
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A. Proof of Lemma 1 (Disagreement Lemma)
Proof. Define for all j ∈ V and all k,
zjk+1 = x
j
k+1 −
n∑
i=1
Bk[j, i]x
i
k (25)
=⇒ xjk+1 = zjk+1 +
n∑
i=1
Bk[j, i]x
i
k (26)
We then unroll the iterations to get xjk+1 as a function of z
j
k+1, and x
i
k and doubly stochastic weight matrix at
current and previous iteration.
xjk+1 = z
j
k+1 +
n∑
i=1
[
Bk[j, i]
(
zik +
n∑
l=1
Bk−1[i, l]xlk−1
)]
We perform the above mentioned unrolling successively and use the definition of transition matrix Φ(k, s),
xjk+1 = z
j
k+1 +
n∑
i=1
Φ(k, 1)[j, i]xi1 +
k∑
l=2
[
n∑
i=1
Φ(k, l)[j, i]zil
]
. (27)
Note that Φ(1, 1) = B1. We verify the expression for k = 1, and we get the relationship x
j
2 = z
j
2+
∑n
i=1 Φ(1, 1)[j, i]x
i
1.
We can write the relation for iterate average, x¯k, and use doubly stochastic nature of Bk to get,
x¯k+1 =
1
n
n∑
j=1
xjk+1 =
1
n
n∑
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
Bk[j, i]x
i
k + z
j
k+1
)
=
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
(
n∑
j=1
Bk[j, i]
)
xik +
n∑
j=1
zjk+1
)
,
= x¯k +
1
n
n∑
j=1
zjk+1 = x¯1 +
1
n
k+1∑
l=2
n∑
j=1
zjl . (28)
Using relations for x¯k+1 (Eq. 28) and x
j
k+1 (Eq. 27) to get an expression for the disagreement. We further use the
property of norm ‖∑ a‖ ≤∑ ‖a‖, ∀a, to get,
‖xjk+1 − x¯k+1‖ ≤
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣ 1n − Φ(k, 1)[j, i]
∣∣∣∣ ‖xi1‖+ k∑
l=2
n∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣ 1n − Φ(k, l)[j, i]
∣∣∣∣ ‖zjl ‖+ ‖zjk+1‖+ 1n
n∑
j=1
‖zjk+1‖. (29)
We use Lemma 4 to bound terms of type
∣∣ 1
n − Φ(k, l)[j, i]
∣∣ and maxi∈V ‖xi1‖ to bound ‖xi1‖, to get,
‖xjk+1 − x¯k+1‖ ≤ nθβk maxi∈V ‖x
i
1‖+ θ
k∑
l=2
βk+1−l
n∑
i=1
‖zil‖+ ‖zjk+1‖+
1
n
n∑
j=1
‖zjk+1‖. (30)
We now bound each of the norms ‖zjk‖, using the fact that vjk ∈ X , the non-expansive property of projection
operator (see Eq. 24), and Assumption 2,
‖zjk+1‖ = ‖PX [vˆjk − αk
(
∇fj(vjk)− ejk
)
]− vˆjk‖ Projected Descent for RSS-NB and RSS-LB, Eq. 18
≤ αk‖∇fj(vjk)− ejk‖
≤ αk
(
‖∇fj(vjk)‖+ ‖ejk‖
)
Triangle inequality
≤ αk (L+ ∆) ‖ejk‖ ≤ ∆(Eq. 19 for RSS-NB and Eq. 21 for RSS-LB) (31)
Note that we used the boundedness of perturbation ejk to obtain the above relation. We show the boundedness
earlier in the report: Eq: 19 for RSS-NB and Eq. 21 for RSS-LB. Next, recall the definition of δjk from Eq. 11.
Combining Eq. 30 and Eq. 31,
max
j∈V
‖δjk+1‖ = maxj∈V ‖x
j
k+1 − x¯k+1‖ ≤ nθβk maxi∈V ‖x
i
1‖+ nθ(L+ ∆)
k∑
l=2
βk+1−lαl−1 + 2αk (L+ ∆)
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B. Proof of Lemma 2 (Iterate Lemma)
Proof. Recall the relationships established in the appendix for our algorithms RSS-NB and RSS-LB.
• RSS-NB (Eq. 19, 20)
– Boundedness ‖ejk‖ ≤ ∆
– Aggregate Randomness
∑
j e
j
k = 0
• RSS-LB (Eq. 21, 22)
– Boundedness ‖ejk‖ ≤ ∆
– Aggregate Randomness
∑
j e
j
k = 0
In summary, for both RSS-NB and RSS-LB, we have showed that ‖ejk‖ ≤ ∆ and
∑
j e
j
k = 0. These relationships
are used for proving Lemma 2 and thereby proving convergence. They allow us to perform unified analysis of both
our algorithms despite the inherent differences ioin RSS-NB and RSS-LB.
To simplify analysis, we adopt the following notation,
η2k =
n∑
j=1
‖xjk − y‖2, (32)
ξ2k =
n∑
j=1
‖vˆjk − y‖2. (33)
Note, ηk and ξk are both functions of y, however for simplicity we do not explicitly show this dependence.
Note, PX [y] = y for all y ∈ X . Using the non-expansive property of the projection operator (Eq. 24), and the
projected gradient descent expression in Eq. 18 we get,
‖xjk+1 − y‖2 = ‖PX
[
vˆjk − αk
(
∇fj(vjk)− ejk
)]
− y‖2
≤ ‖vˆjk − αk
(
∇fj(vjk)− ejk
)
− y‖2 (34)
= ‖vˆjk − y‖2 + α2k‖∇fj(vjk)− ejk‖2 − 2αk
(
∇fj(vjk)− ejk
)T
(vˆjk − y) (35)
Now we add the inequalities Eq. 35 for all agents j = 1, 2, . . . , n followed by using expressions for ηk and ξk
(Eq. 32, Eq. 33). Next we use the boundedness of gradients (Assumption 2) and perturbations (Eq. 19 for RSS-NB
or Eq. 21 for RSS-LB), to get the following inequality,
η2k+1 ≤ ξ2k +
n∑
j=1
α2k‖∇fj(vjk)− ejk‖2 − 2αk
n∑
j=1
(
∇fj(vjk)− ejk
)T
(vˆjk − y)
≤ ξ2k +
n∑
j=1
α2k(‖∇fj(vjk)‖+ ‖ejk‖)2 − 2αk
n∑
j=1
(
∇fj(vjk)− ejk
)T
(vˆjk − y) Triangle Inequality
η2k+1 ≤ ξ2k + α2kn(L+ ∆)2 − 2αk
n∑
j=1
(∇fj(vjk)− ejk)T (vˆjk − y) Assumption 2 and Eq. 19 or Eq. 21 (36)
We use consensus relationship used for information fusion (Eq. 12 for RSS-NB, or Eq. 15 for RSS-LB). We
know that in D-dimension the consensus step can be rewritten using Kronecker product of D-dimension identity
matrix (ID) and the doubly stochastic weight matrix (Bk) [43]. Consider the following notation of vectors. We
use bold font to denote a vector that is stacked by its coordinates. As an example, consider three vectors in R3
given by a = [ax, ay, az]T , b = [bx, by, bz]T , c = [cx, cy, cz]T . Let a be a vector of a, b and c stacked by
coordinates, then it is defined as a = [ax, bx, cx, ay, by, cy, az, bz, cz]T . Similarly we can write stacked model
parameter vector as, xk = [x1k[1], x
2
k[1], . . . , x
n
k [1], x
1
k[2], x
2
k[2], . . . , x
n
k [2], . . . , x
1
k[D], . . . , x
n
k [D]]
T . Next, we write
the consensus term using the new notation and Kronecker products and compare norms of both sides (2-norm),
vˆk = (ID ⊗Bk)xk (37)
vˆk − y = (ID ⊗Bk)(xk − y)
‖vˆk − y‖22 = ‖(ID ⊗Bk)(xk − y)‖22
≤ ‖(ID ⊗Bk)‖22‖(xk − y)‖22 (38)
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We use the property of eigenvalues of Kronecker product of matrices. The eigenvalues of ID ⊗Bk are essentially
D copies of eigenvalues of Bk. Since Bk is a doubly stochastic matrix, its eigenvalues are upper bounded by 1.
Recall that ‖A‖2 =
√
λmax(A†A) where A† represents the conjugate transpose of matrix A and λmax represents
the maximum eigenvalue. Observe that ID ⊗ Bk is a doubly stochastic matrix and (ID ⊗ Bk)†(ID ⊗ Bk) is
also doubly stochastic matrix since product of two doubly stochastic matrices is also doubly stochastic. Clearly,
‖(ID ⊗Bk)‖22 = λmax((ID ⊗Bk)†(ID ⊗Bk)) ≤ 1. 2
ξ2k = ‖vˆk − y‖22 ≤ ‖(xk − y)‖22 = η2k (39)
Merging the inequalities in Eq. 39 and Eq. 36, we get,
η2k+1 ≤ η2k + α2kn(L+ ∆)2−2αk
n∑
j=1
(∇fj(vjk)− ejk)T (vˆjk − y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λ
. (40)
Typically, at this step one would use convexity of fj(x) to simplify the term Λ in Eq. 40. However, since the
gradient of fj(x) is perturbed by noise e
j
k, and we need to follow a few more steps before we arrive at the iterate
lemma.
Consider the fused state iterates vˆjk, the average v¯k , (1/n)
∑n
j=1 vˆ
j
k and the deviation of iterate from the average,
qjk = vˆ
j
k − v¯k. (41)
We now derive a simple inequality here that will be used later. We use the fact that x¯k = v¯k proved earlier in the
appendix (Eq. 23).
‖qjk‖ = ‖vˆjk − v¯k‖ = ‖
n∑
i=1
Bk[j, i]x
i
k − v¯k‖ from Eq. 12 (RSS-NB) or Eq. 15 (RSS-LB)
= ‖
n∑
i=1
Bk[j, i]x
i
k − x¯k‖ x¯k = v¯k,Eq. 23
≤
n∑
i=1
Bk[j, i]‖xik − x¯k‖
≤
(
n∑
i=1
Bk[j, i]
)
max
i∈V
‖xik − x¯k‖
≤ max
j∈V
‖δjk‖ Eq. 11 (42)
Note that similarly, we can derive another inequality that will be used later.
n∑
j=1
‖vˆjk − y‖ =
n∑
j=1
‖
n∑
i=1
Bk[j, i]x
i
k − y‖ from Eq. 12 (RSS-NB) or Eq. 15 (RSS-LB)
=
n∑
j=1
‖
n∑
i=1
Bk[j, i]
(
xik − y
) ‖ Bk is row stochastic
≤
n∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
Bk[j, i]‖xik − y‖
=
n∑
i=1
 n∑
j=1
Bk[j, i]
 ‖xik − y‖
≤
n∑
i=1
‖xik − y‖ Bk is column stochastic (43)
2An alternate way to prove this inequality would be to follow the same process used to prove Eq. 43 except that we start with squared terms
and use the doubly-stochasticity of Bk . Detailed derivation in Appendix H
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We use gradient Lipschiztness assumption and write the following relation,
∇fj(vjk) = ∇fj(v¯k) + ljk, (44)
where, ljk is the (vector) difference between gradient computed at v
j
k (i.e. ∇fj(vjk)) and the gradient computed at
v¯k (i.e. ∇fj(v¯k)). Next, we bound the vector ljk, using Lipschitzness of gradients,
max
j∈V
‖ljk‖ = maxj∈V ‖∇fj(v
j
k)−∇fj(v¯k)‖,
≤ max
j∈V
N‖vjk − v¯k‖, Assumption 2
≤ max
j∈V
{N‖vˆjk − v¯k‖+ αkN‖ejk‖}, Eq. 14 or Eq. 17 and Triangle Inequality
≤ N
(
max
j∈V
‖qjk‖+ αk∆
)
Eq. 41 and ‖ejk‖ ≤ ∆ (45)
We use above expressions to bound the term Λ, in Eq. 40. We use vˆjk = v¯k + q
j
k from Eq. 41 and the gradient
relation in Eq. 44 to get,
Λ = −2αk
n∑
j=1
(∇fj(vjk)− ejk)T (vˆjk − y) = 2αk
n∑
j=1
[
(∇fj(v¯k)− ejk + ljk)T (y − v¯k − qjk)
]
Λ = 2αk [T1 + T2 + T3] , where, T1 =
n∑
j=1
(
∇fj(v¯k)− ejk
)T
(y − v¯k),
T2 =
n∑
j=1
(
∇fj(v¯k)− ejk
)T
(−qjk), and T3 =
n∑
j=1
(ljk)
T (y − v¯k − qjk) =
n∑
j=1
(ljk)
T (y − vˆjk).
Individually T1, T2 and T3 can be bound as follows,
T1 =
n∑
j=1
(
∇fj(v¯k)− ejk
)T
(y − v¯k) = ∇f(v¯k)T (y − v¯k) Eq. 20, Eq. 22,
n∑
j=1
ejk = 0 and
n∑
j=1
∇fj(v¯k) = ∇f(v¯k)
≤ f(y)− f(v¯k) f(x) is convex (46)
T2 =
n∑
j=1
(
∇fj(v¯k)− ejk
)T
(−qjk)
≤
n∑
j=1
‖∇fj(v¯k)− ejk‖‖(−qjk)‖ Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality
≤ (L+ ∆)nmax
j∈V
‖qjk‖ Triangle Inequality and Eq. 19, Eq. 21, Assumption 2
≤ (L+ ∆)nmax
j∈V
‖δjk‖ from Eq. 42 (47)
T3 =
n∑
j=1
(ljk)
T (y − vˆjk)
≤ max
j∈V
‖ljk‖
n∑
j=1
‖vˆjk − y‖
≤ N
(
max
j∈V
‖qjk‖+ αk∆
) n∑
j=1
‖vˆjk − y‖ from Eq. 45
≤ N
(
max
j∈V
‖δjk‖+ αk∆
) n∑
j=1
‖vˆjk − y‖ from Eq. 42
≤ N
(
max
j∈V
‖δjk‖+ αk∆
)[ n∑
j=1
‖xjk − y‖
]
from Eq. 43
We further use 2‖a‖ ≤ 1 + ‖a‖2 to bound term T3.
≤ N
2
(
max
j∈V
‖δjk‖+ αk∆
)[ n∑
j=1
(
1 + ‖xjk − y‖2
)]
2‖a‖ ≤ 1 + ‖a‖2 (48)
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We combine the bounds on T1, T2 and T3 (Eq. 46, 47 and 48) to get,
Λ ≤ 2αk(f(y)− f(v¯k)) + 2αkn(L+ ∆) max
j∈V
‖δjk‖+ αkN
(
max
j∈V
‖δjk‖+ αk∆
)[ n∑
j=1
(
1 + ‖xjk − y‖2
)]
Λ ≤ −2αk (f(v¯k)− f(y)) + 2αkn(L+ ∆) max
j∈V
‖δjk‖+ αkN
(
max
j∈V
‖δjk‖+ αk∆
)[
n+ η2k
]
Eq. 32 (49)
Recall from Eq. 40,
η2k+1 ≤ η2k + α2kn(L+ ∆)2−2αk
n∑
j=1
(∇fj(vjk)− ejk)T (vˆjk − y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λ
. (50)
We replace Λ with its bound from Eq. 49, and use the fact that x¯k = v¯k (Eq. 23) to we replace, f(v¯k) with f(x¯k),
η2k+1 ≤ η2k + α2kn(L+ ∆)2 − 2αk (f(v¯k)− f(y)) + 2αkn(L+ ∆) max
j∈V
‖δjk‖+ αkN
(
max
j∈V
‖δjk‖+ αk∆
)[
n+ η2k
]
≤
(
1 + αkN
(
max
j∈V
‖δjk‖+ αk∆
))
η2k − 2αk (f(v¯k)− f(y)) + 2αkn(L+
N
2
+ ∆) max
j∈V
‖δjk‖
+ α2knN∆ + α
2
kn(L+ ∆)
2
≤ (1 + Fk) η2k − 2αk (f(x¯k)− f(y)) +Hk, (51)
where, Fk = αkN
(
maxj∈V ‖δjk‖+ αk∆
)
and Hk = 2αkn(L+ N2 + ∆) maxj∈V ‖δjk‖+α2kn
[
N∆ + (L+ ∆)2
]
.
We first state a claim about asymptotic behavior of iterates xjk and correspondingly of maxj ‖δjk‖. The claim is
proved in Appendix E after the Proof of Theorem 1.
Claim 1 (Consensus). All agents asymptoticaly reach consensus,
lim
k→∞
max
j
‖δjk‖ = 0 and lim
k→∞
‖xik − xjk‖ = 0,∀i, j.
Proof. See Appendix E.
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We prove convergence using Lemma 5. We begin by using the relation between iterates given in Lemma 2
with y = x∗ ∈ X ∗, and for k ≥ 1,
η2k+1 ≤ (1 + Fk) η2k − 2αk (f(x¯k)− f(y)) +Hk (52)
We check if the above inequality satisfies the conditions in Lemma 5 viz.
∑∞
k=1 Fk <∞ and
∑∞
k=1Hk <∞.
Fk and Hk are defined in Lemma 2 (Eq. 51). Note that Fk and Hk are non-negative, real sequences.
We first show that
∑∞
k=1 αk maxj∈V ‖δjk‖ <∞ using the expression for state disagreement from average given
in Lemma 1.
∞∑
k=1
αk max
j∈V
‖δjk‖ = α1 maxj∈V ‖δ
j
1‖+
∞∑
k=1
αk+1 max
j∈V
‖δjk+1‖
≤ α1 max
j∈V
‖δj1‖︸ ︷︷ ︸
U0
+nθmax
i∈V
‖xi1‖
∞∑
k=1
αk+1β
k
︸ ︷︷ ︸
U1
+nθ(L+ ∆)
∞∑
k=1
αk+1
k∑
l=2
βk+1−lαl−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
U2
+ 2(L+ ∆)
∞∑
k=1
αkαk+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
U3
(53)
(from Lemma 1)
The first term U0 is finite since maxj∈V ‖δj1‖ and α1 are both finite. The second term U1 can be shown to be
convergent by using the ratio test. We observe that,
lim sup
k→∞
αk+2β
k+1
αk+1βk
= lim sup
k→∞
αk+2β
αk+1
< 1⇒
∞∑
k=1
αk+1β
k <∞,
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since, αk+1 ≤ αk and β < 1. Now we move on to show that U2 is finite. It follows from αk ≤ αl when l ≤ k,
and Lemma 3 and
∑
k α
2
k <∞,
∞∑
k=1
αk+1
k∑
l=2
βk+1−lαl−1 ≤
∞∑
k=1
k∑
l=2
βk+1−lα2l−1 <∞.
U3 is finite because U3 ≤ 2(L + ∆)
∑∞
k=1 α
2
k < ∞. Since we have shown, U1 < ∞, U2 < ∞, and U3 < ∞, we
conclude
∑∞
k=1 αk maxj∈V ‖δjk‖ <∞.
Clearly,
∑∞
k=1 Fk < ∞ and
∑∞
k=1Hk < ∞, since we proved that
∑∞
k=1 αk maxj∈V ‖δjk‖ < ∞ and we know
that
∑
k α
2
k <∞. We can now apply Lemma 5 to Eq. 52 and conclude
∑∞
k=1 2αk (f(x¯)− f(x∗)) <∞.
We use
∑∞
k=1 2αk (f(x¯)− f(x∗)) < ∞ to show the convergence of the iterate-average to the optimum. Since
we know
∑∞
k=1 αk = ∞, it follows directly that lim infk→∞ f(x¯k) = f(x∗) = f∗ (an alternate proof for this
statement is provided later in Appendix D).
Also note that Lemma 5 states that η2k has a finite limit. Let limk→∞ η
2
k = ηx∗ (∀x∗ ∈ X ∗).
lim
k→∞
η2k = lim
k→∞
n∑
i=1
‖xik − x∗‖2 = lim
k→∞
n∑
i=1
‖x¯k + δik − x∗‖2
= lim
k→∞
n∑
i=1
[‖x¯k − x∗‖2 + ‖δik‖2 + 2(x¯k − x∗)T δik]
= lim
k→∞
[
n‖x¯k − x∗‖2 +
n∑
i=1
‖δik‖2 + 2(x¯k − x∗)T
(
n∑
i=1
δik
)]
= n lim
k→∞
‖x¯k − x∗‖2 + lim
k→∞
n∑
i=1
‖δik‖2
∑
i
δik = 0 by definition of δ
j
k
= n lim
k→∞
‖x¯k − x∗‖2 , ηx∗ lim
k→∞
max
j∈V
‖δjk‖ = 0 from Claim 1
From the statement above, we know limk→∞ ‖x¯k − x∗‖ =
√
ηx∗
n . This, along with lim infk→∞ f(x¯k) = f(x
∗)
proves that x¯k converges to a point in X ∗.
We know from Claim 1 that the agents agree to a parameter vector asymptotically (i.e. xjk → xik, ∀i 6= j as
k → ∞). Hence, all agents agree to the iterate average. This along with the convergence of iterate-average to an
optimal solution gives us that all agents converge to a point in optimal set X ∗ (i.e. xjk → x∗ ∈ X ∗, ∀j, as k →∞).
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
D. Alternate Proof of lim infk→∞ f(x¯k) = f(x∗) = f∗
Proof. We will prove this statement using contradiction.
We know that
∑
k αk(f(x¯k) − f(x∗)) < ∞ and
∑
k αk = ∞. {f(x¯k)} is a sequence of real numbers and we
know that liminf always exists for this sequence (its either a real number or symbols ±∞). Let us assume that
lim infk→∞ f(x¯k) = f(x∗) + δ for some δ > 0. Note that δ cannot be less than 0 since f(x∗) is the minimum.
Now we know from the definition of lim inf , ∀ > 0, ∃K0 ∈ N such that ∀k ≥ K0,
lim inf
l→∞
f(x¯l)−  ≤ f(x¯k),
=⇒ f(x∗) + δ −  ≤ f(x¯k).
Consider  = δ/2 and we have, ∃K0 such that, ∀k ≥ K0 such that,
f(x∗) +
δ
2
≤ f(x¯k) =⇒ f(x¯k)− f(x∗) ≥ δ
2
.
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Let us consider C ,
∑∞
k=1 αk(f(x¯k)− f(x∗)) <∞.
C ,
∞∑
k=1
αk(f(x¯k)− f(x∗)) =
K0∑
k=1
αk(f(x¯k)− f(x∗)) +
∞∑
k=K0+1
αk(f(x¯k)− f(x∗))
≥
K0∑
k=1
αk(f(x¯k)− f(x∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
+
∞∑
k=K0+1
αk
δ
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
(54)
T1 is finite since C is finite. T2 grows unbounded since
∑∞
k=K0+1
αk = ∞. Substituting both T1 and T2 in
Eq. 54 we get C ≥ ∞ in contradiction. Hence δ = 0, implying lim infk→∞ f(x¯k) = f(x∗) = f∗.
E. Proof of Claim 1 (Consensus Claim)
Proof. We begin with the iterate disagreement relation in Lemma 1,
max
j∈V
‖δjk+1‖ ≤ nθβk max
i∈V
‖xi1‖︸ ︷︷ ︸
V1
+nθ(L+ ∆)
k∑
l=2
βk+1−lαl−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
V2
+ 2αk (L+ ∆)︸ ︷︷ ︸
V3
(55)
The first term V1 decreases exponentially with k. Hence, for any  > 0, ∃ K1 = dlogβ 3nθmaxi∈V ‖xi1‖e such that,∀k > K1, we have V1 < /3.
For given ξ = (1 − β)/6βnθ(L + ∆), ∃K2 such that, αk < ξ, ∀ k ≥ K2, due to the non-increasing property
of αk and
∑
k α
2
k <∞. Observe that,
k−1∑
i=1
(
αiβ
k−i) = (α1βk−1 + . . .+ αK2−1βk−K2+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+
(
αK2β
k−K2 + . . .+ αk−1β1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
We can bound the terms A and B.
A = α1β
k−1 + α2βk−2 + . . .+ αK2−1β
k−K2+1
≤ α1(βk−1 + . . .+ βk−K2+1) α1 ≥ αi ∀ i ≥ 1
≤ α1βk−K2+1
(
1− βK2−1
1− β
)
≤ α1β
k−K2+1
1− β β < 1 (56)
B = αK2β
k−K2 + . . .+ αk−1β1
< ξβ
(
1− βk−K2
1− β
)
≤ ξβ
1− β αi < ξ, ∀i ≥ K2 (57)
The right side of inequality in Eq. 56 is monotonically decreasing in k (β < 1) with limit 0 as k → ∞. Hence
∃K3 > K2 such that A < /6nθ(L+ ∆), ∀ k ≥ K3.
We know αi < ξ = (1 − β)/6βnθ(L + ∆) for all k ≥ K2. Hence, following Eq. 57, B ≤ ξβ1−β =
β(1−β)
6(1−β)βnθ(L+∆) < /6nθ(L + ∆), for all k ≥ K2. Hence, ∃K4 = max{K2,K3} such that V2 = nθ(L +
∆)(A+B) < /3 for all k > K4.
The third term of Eq. 55, V3, decreases at the same rate as αk. Hence, for any  > 0, ∃ K6 = min{k|αk <

6(L+∆)}, such that ∀k > K6, we have V3 < /3.
We have convergence based on − δ definition of limits. For any  > 0, there exists Kmax = max{K1,K5,K6}
such that maxj∈V ‖δjk‖ ≤ V1 + V2 + V3 <  for all k ≥ Kmax. This implies that,
lim
k→∞
max
j∈V
‖δjk‖ = lim
k→∞
max
j∈V
‖xjk − x¯k‖ ≤ 0.
Since, maxj∈V ‖δjk‖ ≥ 0, the above statement implies limk→∞maxj∈V ‖δjk‖ = limk→∞maxj∈V ‖xjk − x¯k‖ = 0.
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Now note that limk→∞maxj∈V ‖xjk − x¯k‖ = 0 =⇒ limk→∞ ‖xjk − x¯k‖ = 0 ∀j. Hence, we can also show that
the following relationship holds,
lim
k→∞
‖xjk − xik‖ = lim
k→∞
‖(xjk − x¯k) + (x¯k − xik)‖
≤ lim
k→∞
(‖xjk − x¯k‖+ ‖x¯k − xik‖) Triangle Inequality
= lim
k→∞
‖xjk − x¯k‖+ lim
k→∞
‖x¯k − xik‖
= 0
Since, ‖xjk − xik‖ ≥ 0, for all i, j, the above statement implies limk→∞ ‖xjk − xik‖ = 0.
F. Proof of Privacy Result (Theorem 2)
Proof. Proof for P2.
(Necessity) Let us assume that κ(G) ≤ f . Hence, if f nodes are deleted (along with their edges) the graph becomes
disconnected to form components I1 and I2, (see Figure 3). Now consider that f nodes, that we just deleted, are
compromised by an adversary. Agents generate correlated noise function using Eq. 8. All the perturbation functions
sj,i(x) shared by nodes in I1 (with agents outside I1) are observed by the coalition. Hence, the true objective
function is easily estimated by using,
∑
l∈I1
fl(x) =
∑
l∈I1
f̂l −
(
j=f∑
j=1,i∈I1
sj,i(x)−
j=f∑
j=2,i∈I1
si,j(x)
)
.
This gives us contradiction. Hence, κ(G) > f is necessary.
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Fig. 3: (Necessity) An example of topology with κ(G) = f .
(Sufficiency) We present a constructive method to show that given an execution (and corresponding observations),
any estimate of objective functions made by the adversary is equally likely.
We conservatively assume that the adversary can observe the obfuscated functions, fˆi(x), the private objective
functions of corrupted nodes fa(x) (a ∈ A) and arbitrary functions transmitted from and received by each of the
coalition members, sa,J and aK,a (J ∈ Na and K such that a ∈ NK , for all a ∈ A). Since the corrupted nodes also
follow the same protocol (Algorithm 3), the adversary is also aware of the fact that the private objective functions
have been obfuscated by function sharing approach (Eq. 9).
fˆi(x) = fi(x) +
∑
k:i∈Nk
sk,i(x)−
∑
j∈Ni
si,j(x)
Clearly, one can rewrite this transformation approach, using signed incidence matrix of bidirectional graph G
[44] [45].
fˆ = f + BR. (58)
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where, fˆ =
[
fˆ1(x), fˆ1(x), . . . , fˆS(x)
]T
is a S × 1 vector of obfuscated functions fˆi(x) for i = {1, 2, . . . , S}, and
f =
[
f1(x), f1(x), . . . , fS(x)
]T
is a S × 1 vector of private (true) objective functions, fi(x). B =
[
BC ,−BC
]
,
where BC (of dimension S × |E|/2) is the incidence matrix of a directed graph obtained by considering only one
of the directions of every bidirectional edge in graph G3. Each column of B represents a directed communication
link between any two agents. Hence, any bidirectional edge between agents i and j is represented as two directed
links, i to j, (i, j) ∈ E and j to i (j, i) ∈ E and corresponds to two columns in B. S represents a |E| × 1 vector
consisting of functions si,j(x). Each entry in vector S, function si,j(x) corresponds to a column of B which, in
turn corresponds to link (i, j) ∈ E ; and similarly, function sj,i(x) corresponds to a different column of B which,
in turn corresponds to link (j, i) ∈ E . Note that `th row of column vector S corresponds to `th column of incidence
matrix B.
We will show that, two different sets of true objective functions (f and fo) and correspondingly two different set
of arbitrary functions (S and G), can lead to exactly same execution and observations for the adversary4. We want
to show that both these cases can result in same obfuscated objective functions. That is,
fˆ = f + BS = fo + BG. (59)
We will show that given any set of private objective functions fo, suitably selecting arbitrary functions gi,j(x)
corresponding to links incident at “good” agents, it is possible to make fo indistinguishable from original private
objective functions f , solely based on the execution observed by the corrupted nodes. We do so by determining
entries of G, which are arbitrary functions that are dissimilar from si,j(x) when i and j are both “good”. The
design G such that the obfuscated objective functions fˆ are the same for both situations.
Since corrupted nodes observe arbitrary functions corresponding to edges incident to and from them, we set
the arbitrary functions corresponding to edges incident on corrupted nodes as gk,a = sk,a and arbitrary functions
corresponding to edges incident away the corrupted nodes as ga,j = sa,j (where k : a ∈ Nk and j ∈ Na, for all
a ∈ A). Now, we define G˜ as the vector containing all elements of G except those corresponding to the edges
incident to and from the corrupted nodes5. Similarly, we define B˜ to be the new incidence matrix obtained after
deleting all edges that are incident on the corrupted nodes (i.e. deleting columns corresponding to the links incident
on corrupted nodes, from the old incidence matrix B). We subtract ga,j(x) and gk,a(x) (∀ a ∈ A) by subtracting
them from [ˆf − fo] (in Eq. 59) to get effective function difference denoted by [ˆf − fo]eff as follows,
[ˆf − fo] = BG = f − fo +BS, . . . (From Eq. 59) (60)
[ˆf − fo]eff
= [ˆf − fo]−
∑
a∈A
 ∑
k:a∈Nk
gk,a(x)−
∑
j∈Na
ga,j(x)
 (61)
= B˜G˜, (62)
where, if d entries of G were fixed6 then G˜ is a (|E|−d)×1 vector and B˜ is a matrix with dimension S×(|E|−d).
The columns deleted from B correspond to the edges that are incident to and from the corrupted nodes. Hence, B˜
represents the incidence of a graph with these edges deleted.
We know from the f -admissibility of the graph, that B˜ connects all the non-adversarial agents into a connected
component7. Since, the remaining edges form a connected component, the edges can be split into two groups. A
group with edges that form a spanning tree over the good nodes (agents) and all other edges in the other group
(see Remark 1 and Figure 4). Let B˜ST represent the incidence matrix8 of the spanning tree and G˜ST represents the
arbitrary functions corresponding to the edges of the spanning tree. B˜EE represents the incidence matrix formed
by all other edges and G˜EE represents the arbitrary functions related to all other edges.
[ˆf − fo]eff =
[
B˜ST B˜EE
] [G˜ST
G˜EE
]
(63)
= B˜STG˜ST + B˜EEG˜EE. (64)
3This represents an orientation of graph G [44].
4f and fo are dissimilar and arbitrarily different.
5The only entries of G, that are undecided at this stage are included in G˜. These are functions gi,j such that i, j are both “good”.
6Total number of edges incident to and from corrupted nodes is d. We fixed them to be the same as corresponding entries from S, since the
coalition can observe them.
7The adversarial nodes become disconnected due to the deletion of edges incident on corrupted nodes (previous step).
8Its columns correspond to the edges that form spanning tree.
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We now arbitrary assign functions to elements of G˜EE and then compute the arbitrary weights for G˜ST. We
know that the columns of B˜ST are linearly independent, since B˜ST is the incidence matrix of a spanning tree (cf.
Lemma 2.5 in [46]). Hence, the left pseudoinverse9 of B˜ST exists; and B˜
†
STB˜ST = I, giving us the solution for
G˜ST
10. And no adversary can estimate any sum of functions associated with strict subset of “good” agents.
G˜ST = B˜
†
ST
[
[ˆf − fo]eff − B˜EEG˜EE
]
. (65)
Using the construction shown above, for any fo we can construct G such that the execution as seen by corrupted
nodes is exactly the same as the original problem where the objective is f and the arbitrary functions are S. A
strong PC coalition cannot distinguish between two executions involving fo and f. Hence, no coalition can estimate
fi(x) (i∈A).
Proof for P1.
(Necessity) The proof of necessity here (for P1) follows the proof of necessity for P2. We prove this statement
by contradiction. Assume that a node i has degree f and we have |A| = f adversaries. Consider that I1 = i in
Figure 3.
Agents generate correlated noise function using Eq. 8. All the perturbation functions sj,i(x) shared by nodes in
I1 (with agents outside I1) are observed by the adversary. Hence, the true objective function is easily estimated by
using,
fi(x) = f̂i −
j=f∑
j=1
sj,i(x)−
j=f∑
j=1
si,j(x)
 .
This gives us contradiction. Hence, degree > f is necessary.
(Sufficiency) We can use a construction similar to the sufficiency proof for P2. Instead of considering all objective
functions f , we consider fi(x).
Remark 1 (Method for Constructing G). We present an example for the construction used in the above proof. Let
us consider a system of S = 7 agents communicating under a topology with κ(G) > 2 (see Figure 4a). An adversary
with two corrupted nodes (A = {6, 7}, f = 2) is a part of the system. We can divide the task of constructing G
into three steps -
1) Fix ga,l and gl,a (links incident on corrupted nodes) to be the corresponding entries in S,
2) Arbitrarily select the functions corresponding to non spanning tree edges (GEE), and
3) Solve for the functions corresponding to the spanning tree (GST) using Eq. 65.
We first, follow the Step 1 and fix gk,a = sk,a and ga,j = sa,j (where k : a ∈ Nk and j ∈ Na, for all a ∈ A).
Step 1 follows form the fact that the adversary observes sk,a and sa,j , and hence they need to be same in both
executions. This is followed by substituting the known entries in G and subtract them from the left hand side as
shown in Eq. 62. This corresponds to the deletion of all incoming and outgoing edges from the corrupted nodes.
The incidence matrix of this new graph is denoted by B˜. The edges in the new graph can be decomposed into two
groups - a set containing edges that form a spanning tree and a set that contains all other edges. This is seen in
Figure 4c where the red edges are all the remaining links (incidence matrix, B˜EE); and Figure 4d where the green
edges form a spanning tree (incidence matrix, B˜ST) with Agent 1 as the root and all other “good” agents as its
leaves (agents 2, 3, 4, 5).
G. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. The proof of Theorem 3 follows from Lemma 2 and a few elementary results on sequences and series.
9A† represents the pseudoinverse of matrix A.
10An alternate way to look at this would be to see that B˜TSTB˜ST represents the edge Laplacian [47] of the spanning tree. The edge Laplacian
of an acyclic graph is non-singular and this also proves that left-pseudoinverse of B˜ST exists.
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(b) Step-1. Fix GA,l and Gl,A.
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(c) Step-2. Arbitrarily select GEE.
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(d) Step-3. Solve for GST (Eq. 65).
Fig. 4: An example of construction used for proving Theorem 2. Network has S = 7 nodes and a adversary with
f = 2 corrupted nodes. The graph topology is 2-admissible.
We begin our analysis by considering the time weighted average of state x̂jT =
∑T
k=1 αkx
j
k∑T
k=1 αk
, and noting the fact
that ¯̂xk = 1n
∑n
j=1 x̂
j
k =
∑T
k=1 αkx¯k∑T
k=1 αk
. Also consider the fact that f(x) is convex. We get,
f(¯̂xT )− f∗ = f
(∑T
k=1 αkx¯k∑T
k=1 αk
)
− f∗ ≤
∑T
k=1 αkf(x¯k)∑T
k=1 αk
− f∗ =
∑T
k=1 αk (f(x¯k)− f∗)∑T
k=1 αk
(66)
Next, consider y ∈ X ∗ in Lemma 2, and we use it to bound the expression in Eq. 66.
f(¯̂xT )− f∗ ≤
∑T
k=1
(
(1 + Fk)η
2
k − η2k+1 +Hk
)
2
∑T
k=1 αk
(67)
Canceling the telescoping terms in Eq. 67, we get,
f(¯̂xT )− f∗ ≤
η21 − η2T+1 +
∑T
k=1
(
Fkη
2
k +Hk
)
2
∑T
k=1 αk
≤ η
2
1 +
∑T
k=1
(
Fkη
2
k +Hk
)
2
∑T
k=1 αk
(68)
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If αk = 1/
√
k, we have from comparison test,
∑T
k=1 αk ≥
√
T . This gives us from Eq. 69,
f(¯̂xT )− f∗ ≤
η21 +
∑T
k=1
(
Fkη
2
k +Hk
)
2
√
T
(69)
Let us define the maximum value of η2k as D0, i.e. D0 , nmaxx,y∈X ‖x− y‖2. Note that due to compactness
of X ⊆ RD, the bound D0 is finite.
f(¯̂xT )− f∗ ≤ D0 +D0
∑T
k=1 Fk +
∑T
k=1Hk
2
√
T
(70)
Next we bound
∑T
k=1 Fk and
∑T
k=1Hk.
T∑
k=1
Fk = N
T∑
k=1
αk max
j
‖δjk‖+N∆
T∑
k=1
α2k
= N
T∑
k=1
αk max
j
‖δjk‖+N∆
T∑
k=1
1
k
≤ N
T∑
k=1
αk max
j
‖δjk‖+N∆(log(T ) + 1)
(
T∑
k=1
1
k
< log(T ) + 1
)
(71)
T∑
k=1
Hk = 2n(L+N/2 + ∆)
T∑
k=1
αk max
j
‖δjk‖+ n[(L+ ∆)2 +N∆]
T∑
k=1
α2k
= 2n(L+N/2 + ∆)
T∑
k=1
αk max
j
‖δjk‖+ n[(L+ ∆)2 +N∆]
T∑
k=1
1
k
≤ 2n(L+N/2 + ∆)
T∑
k=1
αk max
j
‖δjk‖+ n[(L+ ∆)2 +N∆](log(T ) + 1) (72)
We use Lemma 1 to bound
∑T
k=1 αk maxj ‖δjk‖.
T∑
k=1
αk max
j
‖δjk‖ = α1 maxj ‖δ
j
k‖+
T−1∑
k=1
αk+1 max
j
‖δjk+1‖
≤ α1 max
j
‖δj1‖+ nθmax
i
‖xi1‖
T−1∑
k=1
αk+1β
k + nθ(L+ ∆)
T−1∑
k=1
(
αk+1
k∑
l=2
βk+1−lαl−1
)
+ 2(L+ ∆)
T−1∑
k=1
αk+1αk
≤ α1 max
j
‖δj1‖+ nθmax
i
‖xi1‖
T−1∑
k=1
αk+1β
k + nθ(L+ ∆)
T−1∑
k=1
(
αk+1
k∑
l=2
βk+1−lαl−1
)
+ 2(L+ ∆)
T−1∑
k=1
α2k
≤ α1 max
j
‖δj1‖+ nθC0 max
i
‖xi1‖+ nθ(L+ ∆)C1(log(T ) + 1) + 2(L+ ∆)(log(T − 1) + 1)
≤ α1 max
j
‖δj1‖+ nθC0 max
i
‖xi1‖+ 2(L+ ∆) + nθ(L+ ∆)C1 + (nθ(L+ ∆)C1 + 2(L+ ∆)) log(T ) (73)
where C0 =
∑T−1
k=1 αk+1β
k and C1 = β(1−βT−1)/(1−β). The existence of C0 and the bound on C1 is presented
in the next few lines.
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C0 exist and can be proved using ratio test for series convergence. Since, αk+1 ≤ αk and β < 1, we get,
lim sup
k→∞
αk+2β
k+1
αk+1βk
= lim sup
k→∞
αk+2β
αk+1
< 1⇒
∞∑
k=1
αk+1β
k <∞.
Note that C0 ≤
∑∞
k=1 αk+1β
k <∞, hence, C0 is a finite constant.
Next, we estimate a bound on,
∑T−1
k=1
(
αk+1
∑k
l=2 β
k+1−lαl−1
)
.
T−1∑
k=1
(
αk+1
k∑
l=2
βk+1−lαl−1
)
≤
T−1∑
k=1
(
k∑
l=2
βk+1−lα2l−1
)
αk+1 ≤ αl−1,∀l ≤ k
=
T−1∑
k=1
(
k∑
l=2
βk+1−l
l − 1
)
α2l−1 =
1
l − 1
=
T−1∑
k=1
(∑T−1−k
j=1 β
j
k
)
Rearranging Terms
=
T−1∑
k=1
β 1−βT−k1−β
k
 Sum of geometric series T−1−k∑
j=1
βj = β
1− βT−k
1− β
≤ β 1− β
T−1
1− β
T−1∑
k=1
1
k
≤ C1 log(T − 1) + C1 C1 , β 1− β
T−1
1− β and
T−1∑
k=1
1
k
≤ log(T − 1) + 1
≤ C1 log(T ) + C1 log(T − 1) < log(T ) (74)
We use the bound on
∑T
k=1 αk maxj∈V ‖δjk‖ to get the bound on
∑T
k=1 Fk (in Eq. 71) and
∑T
k=1Hk (in Eq. 72).
T∑
k=1
Fk ≤ N
T∑
k=1
αk max
j
‖δjk‖+N∆(log(T ) + 1)
≤ C2 + (C3 + C4) log(T ) (75)
(76)
where,the constants C2, C3 and C4 are defined as,
C2 = N∆ +N
(
α1 max
j
‖δj1‖+ nθC0 max
i
‖xi1‖+ nθ(L+ ∆)C1 + 2(L+ ∆)
)
,
C3 = N∆,
C4 = 2N(L+ ∆) +Nnθ(L+ ∆)C1.
Next we construct a bound on
∑T
k=1Hk.
T∑
k=1
Hk ≤ 2n(L+N/2 + ∆)
T∑
k=1
αk max
j
‖δjk‖+ n[(L+ ∆)2 +N∆](log(T ) + 1)
≤ C5 + (C6 + C7) log(T ) (77)
where, the constants C5, C6 and C7 are defined as,
C5 = 2n(L+N/2 + ∆)
(
α1 max
j
‖δj1‖+ nθC0 max
i
‖xi1‖+ nθ(L+ ∆)C1 + 2(L+ ∆)
)
+ n[(L+ ∆)2 +N∆],
C6 = n[(L+ ∆)
2 +N∆],
C7 = 2n(L+N/2 + ∆) (nθ(L+ ∆)C1 + 2(L+ ∆)) .
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We use the bound from in Eq. 75 and Eq. 77 and combine with finite time relation in Eq. 70.
f(¯̂xT )− f∗ ≤ C8 + (C9 + C10) log(T )
2
√
T
(78)
where,
C8 = D0C2 + C5 +D0,
C9 = D0C3 + C6,
C10 = D0C4 + C7.
Next we use the Lipschitzness of f(x) to arrive at the statement of Theorem 3.
f(x̂jT )− f∗ = f(x̂jT )− f(¯̂xT ) + f(¯̂xT )− f∗ (79)
≤ L‖x̂jT − ¯̂xT ‖+
C8 + (C9 + C10) log(T )
2
√
T
(80)
≤ L
[∑T
k=1 αk‖xjk − x¯k‖∑T
k=1 αk
]
+
C8 + (C9 + C10) log(T )
2
√
T
(81)
≤ L
[∑T
k=1 αk maxj ‖δjk‖∑T
k=1 αk
]
+
C8 + (C9 + C10) log(T )
2
√
T
(82)
≤
[
C11 + C12 log(T )√
T
]
+
C8 + (C9 + C10) log(T )
2
√
T
(83)
where,
C11 = Lα1 max
j
‖δj1‖+ nθLC0 max
i
‖xi1‖+ 2L(L+ ∆),
C12 = nLθ(L+ ∆)C1 + 2L(L+ ∆).
Observe that C9 = O(∆2). We can rewrite the result as,
f(x̂jT )− f∗ = O
(
(1 + ∆2)
log(T )√
T
)
(84)
H. Alternate Proof of Eq 39
Proof. We begin with the consensus update equation in Eq. 12 (RSS-NB) and Eq. 15 (RSS-LB), followed by
subtracting vector y ∈ X on both sides.
vˆik =
n∑
j=1
Bk[i, j]x
j
k (85)
vˆik − y =
n∑
j=1
Bk[i, j](x
j
k − y) because
n∑
j=1
Bk[i, j] = 1 (86)
Let us define zˆik = vˆ
i
k − y and zik = xik − y, ∀ i = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Then we can rewrite the above equation as,
zˆik =
S∑
j=1
Bk[i, j]z
j
k (87)
We now norm both sides of the equality and use the property that norm of sum is less than or equal to sum of
norms.
‖zˆik‖ = ‖
n∑
j=1
Bk[i, j]z
j
k‖ ≤
n∑
j=1
Bk[i, j]‖zjk‖ since Bk[i, j] ≥ 0 (88)
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Squaring both sides in the above inequality followed by algebraic expansion, we get,
‖zˆik‖2 ≤
 n∑
j=1
Bk[i, j]‖zjk‖
2 = n∑
j=1
Bk[i, j]
2‖zjk‖2 + 2
∑
m<j
Bk[i, j] Bk[i,m] ‖zjk‖‖zmk ‖ (89)
Now we use the property, a2 + b2 ≥ 2ab for any a, b in the latter term of the expansion above,
‖zˆik‖2 ≤
n∑
j=1
Bk[i, j]
2‖zjk‖2 +
∑
m<j
Bk[i, j] Bk[i,m]
(
‖zjk‖2 + ‖zmk ‖2
)
. (90)
Rearranging and using row stochasticity of Bk matrix we get,
‖zˆik‖2 ≤
n∑
j=1
‖zjk‖2
Bk[i, j]2 + ∑
m 6=j
Bk[i, j] Bk[i,m]
 (91)
≤
n∑
j=1
‖zjk‖2
Bk[i, j]
Bk[i, j] + ∑
m 6=j
Bk[i,m]
 (92)
≤
n∑
j=1
Bk[i, j]‖zjk‖2 Row stochasticity of Bk gives Bk[i, j] +
∑
m6=j
Bk[i,m] = 1, (93)
Summing the inequality over all servers, i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
n∑
i=1
‖zˆik‖2 ≤
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Bk[i, j]‖zjk‖2 =
n∑
j=1
(
‖zjk‖2
[
n∑
i=1
Bk[i, j]
])
(94)
≤
n∑
j=1
‖zjk‖2 Column stochasticity of Bk gives
n∑
i=1
Bk[i, j] = 1, (95)
This gives us Eq. 39,
ξ2k =
n∑
j=1
‖vˆjk − y‖2 ≤
n∑
j=1
‖xjk − y‖2 = η2k (96)
